Treaties as Law in National Courts: The United States by Wright, Quincy
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 4
A Symposium on Legislation
June 1956
Treaties as Law in National Courts: The United
States
Quincy Wright
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Quincy Wright, Treaties as Law in National Courts: The United States, 16 La. L. Rev. (1956)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol16/iss4/15
TREATIES AS LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS:
THE UNITED STATES*
Quincy Wright**
In discussing the problem of treaties as law in national
courts we must accept the dualist point of view that interna-
tional courts apply international law and national courts apply
national law. The sources of these two branches of law are
different, so that rules may be in conflict. Unless appropriate
processes exist for dealing with such conflicts, serious situations
may develop.
Dualism implies that treaties, the object of which is to estab-
lish a relationship in international law, are applicable in na-
tional courts only insofar as incorporated in national law. The
same is true of customary international law. International
monists hold that such incorporation is automatic - that na-
tional courts must apply international law in case of conflict -
but this theory has no support in practice.
International tribunals are not concerned with the problem
of incorporation. It is their function to apply international law,
anything in the national laws of the states before them to the
contrary notwithstanding. For them, states are bound by inter-
national law and the treaties they have concluded. Failure to
incorporate the rules of international law and treaties in their
national law, or acts of national legislation in violation of these
rules, offer no defense in international tribunals against the
state's liability under international law.
National courts, however, under the dualist theory, are nec-
essarily concerned with methods of incorporation and the ex-
tent to which the rules of a particular treaty or of general inter-
national law have been incorporated. Such incorporation may
be effected by a general constitutional prescription, such as that
in article VI of the United States Constitution, which declares
that treaties are the supreme law of the land, or it may be ef-
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fected by specific legislation, dealing with a particular treaty
or a particular body of customary law. In Great Britain, for
example, where treaties are concluded by the Crown in Council,
they are not normally directly applicable as law in national
courts, although there is an exception in the case of prize courts.
It is, therefore, in most cases necessary for Parliament to pass
legislation incorporating the rules of a treaty in national law.
The government usually lays draft treaties before Parliament
and obtains such legislation before ratifying the treaty so there
is seldom any difficulty. Continental European constitutions
usually require the participation of the Legislature in the making
of treaties effecting individual rights, and then authorize the
courts to apply such treaties as law.
In the United States, it is the general principle, deduced from
article VI and other articles of the Constitution, that both trea-
ties and customary international law are parts of the law of
the land, directly applicable by the courts. But there are ex-
ceptions to this broad principle. Customary international law
has been regarded as part of the common law, and is therefore
directly applicable by courts, both federal and state, but only if
there is no specific rule of a treaty, of legislation, of executive
order, or of judicial precedent to the contrary. Furthermore, it
has been held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to deal with
crimes under customary international law, except insofar as
recognized by congressional legislation.
In regard to treaties, it has been held that they are, like all
other acts of the federal government, subject to the Constitu-
tion. They must have been concluded in accord with the con-
stitutional procedures and, in substance, they must deal with a
matter of genuine international interest. They cannot be a sub-
terfuge for achieving domestic legislation. This issue has rarely
risen in the courts, and doubtless if it did the courts would
usually treat it as a political question, to be decided by the po-
litical organs of government. Furthermore, treaties cannot vio-
late specific prohibitions of the Constitution, such as those in-
cluded in the Bill of Rights and in the guarantees of the terri-
torial integrity and republican form of government of the
states. The problem of conflict with the Bill of Rights might
arise judicially and, in one case, where a treaty with France
had reciprocally given consuls immunity from subpoena as
witnesses in criminal cases, it was said that this immunity con-
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flicted with the constitutional right of a person accused of a
crime to subpoena witnesses in his behalf. There can be no doubt
but that a treaty which encroached upon constitutional rights
of the individual would be regarded as unconstitutional and
would not be applied by national courts.
Even in such a case, however, a problem would remain of
the international validity of the treaty. Foreign governments
have taken the position that they cannot be expected to know
how the courts of the United States will interpret constitutional
guarantees, and that their only access to American constitu-
tional limitations is through the President and the Secretary of
State, with whom alone they can deal. Consequently, if these
officials, by signing and obtaining ratification of a treaty, assert,
directly or by implication, that it accords with the Constitution,
foreign governments are entitled to assume that the treaty is
valid and the United States is bound, even though American
courts subsequently reach the conclusion that the treaty is in-
applicable nationally because of the Constitution. This argu-
ment, which has usually been supported in international law,
means that the responsibility for maintaining constitutional
guarantees in relation to treaties, necessarily belongs to the
President and the Senate, in conducting the process of treaty-
making. Congressional or judicial action after the treaty has
been concluded may nullify the treaty in national law, but can-
not relieve the United States of its international obligations
under it. This has been clearly recognized in the case of con-
gressional legislation in violation of a treaty, such, for instance
as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888. The Supreme Court held
that the act of Congress was applicable even though in violation
of a treaty with China. (The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581 [1889]). But subsequent diplomatic experience indicated
that in international law, the United States remained bound by
the treaty.
From this it flows that if there is a conflict between congres-
sional legislation and a treaty, the most recent will be applied
by national courts. Since article VI of the Constitution declares
that both treaties and acts of Congress are supreme law of the
land, the Court has not felt itself justified in giving a priority
to either so far as national law is concerned.
Another exception to the judicial application of treaties lies
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in the distinction, originally made by Chief Justice Marshall in
Foster v. Neilson (27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 [1829]) between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties. The latter refers to
treaty obligations, the execution of which is specifically vested
in the Congress. This has been held true of treaties requiring
an appropriation. Such treaties cannot be carried out until
Congress acts. The same has been held in regard to treaty obli-
gations concerning criminal punishment. They cannot be exe-
cuted without congressional action defining the crime and con-
ferring jurisdiction on a court. The line between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties is, however, a vague one, which
has been drawn only by judicial precedents. In general, treaties
specifying rights of aliens have been held self-executing and
the courts have on numerous occasions enforced them, even
though contrary to state legislation.
This is a matter of particular importance because it indicates
that the treaty-making power in some respects goes beyond the
delegated powers of Congress. One of the important objects of
treaties is to assure protection of American citizens abroad, and,
obviously, this implies a reciprocity whereby citizens of the
other State will be protected in the United States. The protec-
tion of individual rights is, however, normally within the domain
of the States. Consequently if this treaty function is to be
carried out, the treaty-making power must go beyond the dele-
gated powers of Congress. It is clear that it was intended to
do so, because it was on precisely such issues, which arose under
the Articles of the Confederation, that article VI of the Con-
stitution was inserted. Under the Articles of Confederation, the
States had consistently violated rights assured the Englishmen
under the Treaty of Peace of 1783, with the result that the
national government was seriously hampered in the conduct of
foreign relations. After the Constitution was in effect, the
courts had no hesitancy in applying these provisions of treaties
concluded before the Constitution. This situation accounts for
the terminology of Article VI of the Constitution, making trea-
ties supreme law of the land if made under the authority of the
United States, while this is true of the laws of the United States
only if made in pursuance of the Constitution.
It is to be noted that the principle making most treaty pro-
visions self-executing applies only to treaty obligations and not to
treaty permissions. If the United States entered into a treaty
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permitting it to take measures contrary to the Bill of Rights,
for example, it is clear that this would give neither the courts
nor the Congress the power to take advanatge of such permis-
sion. The permission is under international, not constitutional,
law. It is important to emphasize this, because some adherents
* of the Bricker amendment movement have suggested that an
international Human Rights Covenant might not go so far in
the protection of civil liberties as does our Constitution, and
that in that case it would permit Congress to violate the Bill
of Rights. There is no authority for this position. It is only
treaty obligations which can be regarded as self-executing. The
Human Rights Covenant would oblige states not to fall below
the standard it established, but it would not oblige them to re-
frain from going above that standard.
It is clear, however, that a treaty obligation such as that
undertaken by the United States in the migratory bird treaty
with Canada, justifies Congress, the courts, and other organs
of the government in utilizing their powers to enforce the obli-
gation by punishing poachers, even though it goes beyond the
delegated powers of Congress. This is the issue raised in the
case of Missouri v. Holland. (252 U.S. 416 [1920]) The normal
powers of the states are not prohibitions against treaty making
and the protection of migratory birds is a matter of genuine
international interest. Under the necessary and proper clause,
Congress has power to enforce treaty obligations, which have
been assumed in the constitutional manner, which are within
the proper orbit of treaty-making, and which do not conflict
with a positive prohibition of the Constitution.
Furthermore, a treaty obligation is not self-executing unless
it is sufficiently precise to be applied as a rule of law. This is
the issue raised in connection with article 56 of the United
Nations Charter, by which the members of the United Nations
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in coopera-
tion with the organization, for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in article 55. According to this article, the United
Nations shall promote higher standards of living, full employ-
ment, and other economic and social objectives, as well as uni-
versal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion. In the Fujii case, a lower California court
held that this treaty provision constituted an obligation which
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would be violated if the California Land Act, discriminating
against Japanese in the ownership of land, were enforced. (Sei
Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 218 P.2d 595 [1950]) The Supreme
Court of California, however, held that articles 55 and 56 of
the Charter were too vague to be applied as rules of law. (38
Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 [1952]) Undoubtedly, these articles do
imply some obligation, but the obligation may be only to ne-
gotiate covenants of human right and other instruments through
the United Nations. On this particular matter the Supreme
Court of the United States has not yet expressed its opinion,
though the dicta of some of the Justices in other cases suggest
that the Court may eventually regard at least some of the pro-
visions of articles 55 and 56 as constituting self-executing obli-
gations.
To be applicable in the courts, a treaty must, of course, have
been made in accordance with the procedure established by the
Constitution. For most important instruments, this means the
President acting with consent of two-thirds of the Senate. It is
clear, however, that the constitutional powers of the President
as Commander-in-Chief, as chief administrative officer of the
federal government, and as representative of the United States
in diplomacy, gives him authority to make executive agreements
insofar as essential for the exercise of these powers. It is also
clear that Congress can, within the orbit of its delegated powers,
authorize executive agreements to carry out its expressed legisla-
tive policies. The line between executive agreements, congres-
sional executive agreements, and treaties in the strict sense of
the word, has not been clearly drawn. It would seem to depend
upon the authority to execute the obligations undertaken. Inso-
far as the President under his constitutional powers can carry
out such obligations without support from any other organ of
the federal government or without encroaching upon the normal
powers of the states, it would seem that he can make the instru-
ment constitutionally under his own authority alone. It is true
that the Belmont and Pink cases seem to have suggested a some-
what wider scope of executive agreement making. (United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 [1937] ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 [1942]) The conclusion reached in these cases can, however,
be justified on other grounds. I think it can generally be said
that an executive agreement which encroaches upon the normal
powers of the states, and which is not within the normal powers
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of the President to execute, would not be applied as law by the
courts.
The complexity of our problem lies in the dilemma arising
because of the unified responsibility of the United States under
international law, and the limitation of the powers of all organs
of the government under the Constitution. The United States
may be responsible and yet the President, as sole representa-
tive organ in international relations, may lack power to dis-
charge the responsibility to solve the dilemma. On the one hand,
every organ of the government should use its powers to assure
that international responsibilites which have been undertaken
will be fulfilled; but on the other, no organ should exercise its
powers in a way to accept national responsibilites which are not
likely to be discharged or can only be discharged by violating
the principle of democratic consent to major decisions. These
principles are flexible and political. They lie in the realm of
constitutional and international understanding, rather than of
law. They call for a spirit of cooperation among President,
Senate, House, courts, and states, in the process of making and
fulfilling treaties and other international commitments, rather
than in a spirit of self-centered legalism, which has too often
animated these organs to the detriment of a sound conduct of
foreign policy.
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